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Weber and Coyote: polytheism as a practical attitude 
Do I contradict myself?  
Very well then I contradict myself,  
(I am large, I contain multitudes.) 
—Walt Whitman ‘Song Of Myself’ 
Max Weber (1864-1920) is one of the founders of sociology, and is remembered especially as the great 
theorist of bureaucratic rationalisation.  This, according to Weber, is a deep and ancient tendency in our 
civilisation.  To take as an example the context I know best, we university academics see bureaucratic 
rationalisation happening every day in our universities and in education generally.  As the head of an 
academic department, I have to contribute to it, and sometimes to enforce it.  Weber persuades me that 
it is inevitable, and daily work persuades me that sometimes it is a good thing—we would not wish our 
curricula or assessment procedures to be whimsical or arbitrary.  At the same time, it is clear to me, as it 
was clear to Weber, that rationalisation comes at a cost in spontaneity and flexibility.  That matters in 
education because learning is unpredictable and unruly.  Flashes of insight can be planned for, but they 
cannot be programmed.  Therefore, we academics have to think about how to practise an anarchic 
activity in a rationalised environment.i  This tension between anarchic activity and rationalised structure 
is not unique to education.  It is found in any occupation where learning or creativity coexist with 
imperatives towards efficiency or reliability.  
My understanding of the anarchic end of this dialectical dyad will mostly come from Lewis Hyde’s book 
Trickster Makes This World: how disruptive imagination creates culture.ii  Hyde explores myths about 
tricksters such as the Yoruba spirit Eshu, the Greek Hermes, the Norse Loki and the Coyote and Raven 
stories of some of the native cultures of North America.  He is particularly interested in the importance 
of trickery in stories about how the world came to be the way it is.  Note that these examples all come 
from polytheisms.  Hyde makes few references to the Abrahamic faiths, even though they share the 
story of the fall, brought about by the serpent’s trickery, and the god of the Old Testament plays a few 
tricks of His own.  Early in his book, Hyde asks whether trickster is with us now and considers that the 
answer may be ‘no’, because “trickster only comes to life in the complex terrain of polytheism” 
(pp. 9-10).  If that is true, and if we need trickster to create and re-create the world, and if we in the UK 
(and similar societies) are a deeply monotheistic culture, then we are in trouble.  However, Weber offers 
grounds for optimism on this point.  Writing in 1918, he claimed that:  
Many old gods ascend from their graves; they are disenchanted and hence take the form of 
impersonal forces.  They strive to gain power over our lives and again they resume their eternal 
struggle with one another.iii 
As we will see, there are in Weber’s view some new gods vying for control over and sacrifice from 
humanity as well as the old ones.  If Weber is right, and the winter of monotheism is giving way to a new 
polytheism (albeit of a disenchanted sort) then perhaps the trickster can live among us after all. 
The plan of this paper, therefore, is to elaborate some basic notions from Weber (rationalisation, 
disenchantment, bureaucracy), to explore Hyde’s thesis in more detail, and then to take up this question 
of the plurality of spirits both around and within us, and whether the trickster is one of them.  Weber 
has three roles in this argument.  First, he theorises rationalisation, disenchantment and bureaucracy; 
second, he offers an argument that in a certain sense polytheism is returning (if it ever went away); and 
third, he presents a way to translate the mytho-poetic register in which Hyde works into terms 
acceptable to social science of a more materialist bent.  We saw this last role in the quotation above; his 
resurgent old gods are impersonal social forces.  This allows us to draw on Hyde without falling into 
mystery-mongering.  
Rationalisation, disenchantment and bureaucracy 
“The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the 
‘disenchantment of the world.’”iv   Rationalisation, in Weber’s work, is a steady tendency towards 
system, order, standardisation, repetition, measurement, intellectualisation, explicit rules and calculated 
efficiency and effectiveness, in more or less all domains of life.  Methods of farming and cooking that 
were justified by tradition lose out to scientifically tested methods.  Even if the first attempt at scientific 
farming fails, the idea of trying new methods in a systematic fashion to see what works best will displace 
ancient lore as the standard practice.  Businesses that take careful account of their costs and find ways 
of measuring apparently intangible factors like risk and depreciation will drive out family firms that trade 
in traditional ways.  Legal practice starts with local wise-folk making case-by-case judgments, but will 
eventually develop an ordered code.  There may be an intermediate stage where the law is a mass of 
disconnected written rules, but eventually the practical demands of maintaining consistency and 
training new judges will prompt a search for fundamental principles.  Questions of fairness will attach to 
legal processes as well as to legal outcomes.  This will lead to standard procedures.  At every stage, it is 
practical need that drives the tendency to rationalisation.  In pre-modern history, this was largely the 
result of the growth of large states.  The Roman Empire required greater levels of standardisation than 
the city states of ancient Greece.  Stephen Toulmin recounts Polybius’s report that Greek and Roman 
armies had differing ways of laying out their military camps.  The Greeks would reconfigure their 
campsites as they travelled to take best advantage of the terrain.  They did not have to do so much 
digging of artificial defences as the Romans, but suffered the disadvantage that no one could be sure of 
their relative positions, which made it harder to organise themselves.  The Romans, in contrast, pitched 
their military camps in the same configuration regardless of the terrain, according to a precise standard 
plan, even if this required a lot more entrenching.v  Toulmin offers reasons to prefer the Greek way, but 
the Romans won.  Now, the same pressures drive large companies to standardise and unify their 
products and procedures.  This was evident to Weber, but digital technology has intensified this process 
beyond even his imagining.  
Scholarship since Weber's time has filled in many of the details of this process.  For the European 
medieval part of the story, see Alfred Crosby's book The Measure of Reality: Quantification and Western 
Society 1250-1600.  Cosby explains, for example, the process whereby music came to be written in a 
standardised notation and consequently became increasingly homogenised.  He relates the rapid 
introduction of public clocks from the early fourteenth century onwards (chapter four) and the 
consequent introduction of standardised hours and routines.  To take an example close to scholarly 
life, Crosby explains how the medieval schoolmen found themselves overwhelmed with texts and had to 
find some system for ordering and retrieving them.  Their first library catalogues ordered material in 
descending order of importance, starting with the Bible.  This proved impractical, so they began to put 
texts in alphabetical order as we still do today (p. 63).  As Crosby shows, it was not long before 
Europeans quantified more or less everything, for practical reasons, and not because they were in the 
grip of an ideology that drove them to it.  And in order to quantify space, time, music and so on, these 
magnitudes have to be divided into standard units.   
Part of rationalisation for Weber is ‘intellectualisation’.  Here too, Weber did not mean to suggest that 
there is a pure drive in humans to theorise, but rather, again, that the practical demands of everyday life 
tend towards the emergence of theoretical understanding.  This does not mean that people in general 
nowadays understand their surroundings better.  People now do not know how their gadgets work, nor 
why their world is the way it is (the economic crash of 2008 is a mystery to most people even 
now).  “The increasing intellectualization and rationalization do not… indicate an increased and general 
knowledge of the conditions under which one lives."  Rather, Weber says, "It means something else, 
namely, the knowledge or belief that if one but wished one could learn it at any time.  Hence, it means 
that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, 
in principle, master all things by calculation."vi  
This practical need to theorise applies to matters of religion too.  Where first there might have been 
ritual combined with storytelling and a diffuse sense of awe and dread, eventually religion differentiates 
itself from drama and entertainment to produce intellectuals like Thomas Aquinas, writing thick books 
of closely-argued theology.  We should not suppose that the intellectualised religion of Aquinas was any 
less deeply felt than that of an illiterate shaman, nor that the rationalisation of religion was not driven 
by perceived practical need.  For people who believe in hellfire as firmly as we believe in atoms, it is 
urgently practical that there should be experts who think about salvation with as much scientific rigour 
as possible.  Moreover, it would be an error to suppose that religious movements that seem to turn 
away from intellectualisation, such as mysticism and pietism, are counterexamples, because they do so 
as a conscious reaction to the prevailing rationalisation of culture, and they explain themselves in its 
terms.  One cannot, now, simply practice an ecstatic religion as some ancient cultures did; one has to 
have a theology of ecstasy, a rational account of the place of ecstatic experience in religious life.  For 
another example: those religious movements that reject the theory of evolution feel a need to justify 
their stance in scientific terms.  Thus, we see ‘creation science’.   
The consequence of intellectualisation is a process that Weber described with a phrase from Schiller: 
'the disenchantment of the world'.  Continuing the last quotation: "This [rationalisation] means that the 
world is disenchanted.  One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to implore the 
spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed.  Technical means and calculations 
perform the service.  This above all is what intellectualization means.”  It must be borne in mind that 
these claims are about the prevailing social order, the means whereby society organises itself and 
carries out its functions.  The disenchantment thesis, for example, does not entail that nobody ever tries 
to affect events by magical means, perhaps by imploring mysterious powers.  Rather, it means that 
there are no public rites of propitiation or divination.  No significant institutions of our society try to 
achieve their practical ends by casting horoscopes or making sacrifices.  Such public religious ceremonies 
as we have are restricted to non-magical functions like proclamation, recognition and 
commemoration.  Efforts at magic are all private affairs.   
Weber took care not to suggest that rationalisation is inevitable in some metaphysical sense akin to the 
progress of Hegel’s Geist.  He aimed to found sociology as an empirical science in contrast to the a priori 
philosophies of history that flourished in the nineteenth century.  He knew that heavily rationalised 
societies can collapse, perhaps as a result of military defeat by nomadic hordes.  He was particularly 
interested in the role of charismatic leaders, be they military, political or religious, as counter-forces to 
rationalisation (Weber died in 1920, so he did not live to see how prescient this interest 
was).  Nevertheless, the direction of his writing, and the evidence of history since his day, suggests that 
aside from occasional retrograde interludes, the path of human civilisation is towards ever more 
rationalised forms of organisation.  This does not prevent individuals from clinging to old ways and 
suffering from superstitions.  But they do so in an increasingly disenchanted and rationalised social 
order, so their traditions and superstitions appear as nostalgia and individual eccentricity.  Individuals 
might have mystical experiences, but in a disenchanted world, these cannot be effectively expressed or 
socially grounded.  
Note that rationalisation is ancient, deep and pervasive.  It is not associated with the spirit of any 
particular age; rather, it progresses across ages.  It is not the result of the religious, ideological or 
psychological specificity of any ruling power; rather, it arises from the natural and universal human 
activity of matching ends with means.  Any attempt to blame the fact that we live in a standardised, 
quantified, bar-coded world on something recent or partisan (such as modernity, or capitalism, or digital 
technology, or loss of deference to authorities, or totalitarian tendencies in high places, etc.) is a failure 
to appreciate the age, depth and scope of the phenomenon.   
The last Weberian concept that I wish to introduce is bureaucracy.  Weber inherited from his parents a 
practical interest in German politics, and when he writes about bureaucracy, it is worth keeping the late 
nineteenth-century German civil service in mind.  Bureaucracy, for Weber, is the result of rationalisation 
in the realm of human organisation.  What he calls the pure type of bureaucracy is "superior to any 
other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes 
possible a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of the organization and for 
those acting in relation to it."vii  He considers it to be the most efficient way of controlling people.  This 
pure type of bureaucracy is characterised as follows:  
1) officials are free citizens (as opposed to, say, the scribe-slaves of ancient empires)  
2) strict hierarchy  
3) specified scope of responsibility for each office  
4) everything important is formally recorded in writing  
5) officials are appointed in a free selection, based on technical competence demonstrated by 
examinations  
6) officials are paid a fixed salary, regardless of the outcome of the policies they enact  
7) officials do not use their own equipment or money  
8) officials cannot gain extra money or goods in kind from their offices (unlike, say, tax-farmers, or 
societies where gifts to officials are normal)  
9) officials are under the strict discipline of the organisation.   
Weber includes large private corporations in his analysis.  The difference between public and private 
ownership is not decisive of whether an organisation counts as a bureaucracy in Weber's sense.  To 
reiterate: the existence of such bureaucracies is not the result of a 'bureaucratic mentality'—rather, 
there are bureaucrats with a bureaucratic mentality because the practical needs of our society demand 
bureaucracies.   
Much of this may seem familiar and obvious, but that is because we no longer live in a society where, for 
example, military commissions, church livings and judgments in lower courts can be bought.  On the 
other hand, for the past four decades or so, there has been a challenge to Weber's claim that this type 
of organisation is the most efficient.  There is now a market-based, 'entrepreneurial' model that (of the 
characteristics just listed) is opposed to 2, suspicious of 3, 4 and 5, and positively contemptuous of 
6.  The 'entrepreneurial' spirit wants to flatten hierarchies, does not care about qualifications or 
processes except as they affect results, and does not understand why an official would work hard if 
there is no financial incentive.  It is this spiritviii that, for example, wishes to replace certification of 
school-teachers with payment by results.  The principal argument in favour of this view is that market 
mechanisms calculate efficiencies more finely than bureaucracies, and motivate people to improve.ix  
For this reason, the emergence of this 'entrepreneurial' model of humanity and society does not 
threaten Weber's deeper claims about rationalisation.  The entrepreneurial model challenges the 
bureaucratic model on grounds of efficiency.  It does not challenge Weber’s claim that efficiency is the 
decisive factor in the evolution of society and that the triumph of instrumental rationality is the almost 
inevitable outcome.   
Now, it is time to meet the anarchic side of the dyad.   
Tricksters 
The subtitle of the second edition of Hyde's book is how disruptive imagination creates 
culture.  Understanding this, rather than simply cataloguing myths about tricky gods and spirits, is his 
real aim.  His focus is on art, though disruptive imagination has a place in science too.x  I first learned of 
Hyde's book from the mathematician Michael Harris.  He got interested in tricksters when one of his 
mathematical innovations was described as ‘Harris’s tensor trick’, and he wondered how to take this 
epithet.xi  A trick is not a method.  It exploits the specifics of the problem it solves more in the 
opportunistic manner of the Greek military camp than the Roman approach.  'Method', on the other 
hand, suggests the uniform procedure of the Roman camp.  The trickster seeks to take imaginative 
advantage of features of the situation that a more methodical approach might miss.  The moral 
ambiguity of the term arises from the cases where the situation includes other people.   
Hyde proceeds by exploring myths about tricky spirits from all over the world.  He recognises the danger 
of forming a composite out of figures from many different traditions, but his aim is rather to use these 
stories to say something about intelligence, imagination and culture.  Indeed, I suspect that his 
confidence that the stories can be usefully juxtaposed arises from a conviction that they express some 
common human truths.  The most obvious things that his tricksters tend to have in common are theft 
and deceit, a kind of 'Artful Dodger' intelligence and boldness of action that gets them into trouble as 
often as it brings rewards.  They are marginal figures, often found on roads or at crossroads rather than 
in the settlement where the rule of law prevails.  However, they are not just thieves and con-
artists.  Their schemes are cosmically significant.  They steal important things (fire, water, daylight, 
agriculture and the like) from important people (usually other mythological personages).  They are often 
the mediators between gods and humans.  This places them at the margin of divine society.  Hermes, 
the messenger of the Olympian gods, had to steal cattle from Apollo and (effectively) sacrifice them to 
himself in order to become a real god (and being a self-made god, is as much a parvenu as a self-made 
man).  Loki is never really welcome in Asgard.   
Tricksters in cosmic origin stories are often responsible for bringing change, contingency, fate or death 
into the world.  The trickster belongs on the road and especially at crossroads in part because he (it 
invariably is he in these stories, for reasons that Hyde exploresxii) is marginal, liminal and a go-between 
for humans and gods.  There is another reason for this; it is on journeys that contingency can 
flourish.  The Yoruba trickster Eshu is the god of divination.  This does not mean that he (through the 
seer) tells the future.  Rather, he gives advice about the future by reminding the petitioner of things that 
are always true.  Hyde recounts the case of a man going on a journey who asks for advice (Hyde 2008 
pp. 114-5).  He is told the tale of a man who travels to a town where he is not known, and there, 
through a series of accidental events that could not have happened in his hometown where he had a 
fixed social position, he ends up with a family without having to pay a dowry.  At home, there are fixed 
roles, fixed relationships and predictable outcomes.  On the road, there are accidents and chance 
meetings that can be opportunities for a bold, imaginative traveller with an eye on the main 
chance.  The crossroads is especially important because real contingency happens when two 
independent causal chains intersect.  The cat startled by a barking dog dashes in the road causing a car 
to swerve, which car would not have been there had the driver not been held up earlier by a phone-
call.  The resulting swerve causes a minor accident, as a result of which the drivers of two cars exchange 
phone numbers...  The progress of one causal chain (dog barks, cat starts) was predictable, as was the 
other (phone rings, driver delayed), until they cross.   
Such radical contingency is essential to the trickster because it allows him to exercise his guile.  This 
brings up a point that Hyde illustrates with Coyote stories.  Other animals have fixed ways of catching 
prey or of avoiding capture--speed, disguise, armour, webs or poison.  Coyote has none of these; he has 
no way of his own, so he tries to imitate the ways of other animals.  The ability to think like a fish, or like 
a lion, is what makes Coyote tricky—to fool another, a trickster must look at the world through that 
person’s eyes.  It’s notable that apart from tricksters, this ability is quite rare among gods and 
mythological beings.  This makes tricksters dangerous, but it also equips them to be effective mediators.   
One of the stories with a direct bearing on this paper is Ragnarok, the doom of the Norse gods.   Baldr, 
the son of Odin and Frigg, is the god of light and purity.  He has a prophetic dream about his own 
death.  His mother Frigg travels the world to extract from everything a promise not to harm her son, but 
she overlooks mistletoe.  Loki makes an arrow out of mistletoe and gives it to a blind god during an 
archery contest in which the gods celebrate Baldr's invulnerability by using him as a target.  Under Loki's 
guidance, the blind god shoots Baldr dead.  To punish Loki, and to prevent further mischief, the gods 
bind Loki.  This, though, causes the world to die and the gods with it.  It is only when Loki is freed that 
the world and the gods are reborn.  In Hyde's reading of this myth, Loki has to react to Frigg's attempt to 
save her son from contingency, danger and death because he is the god of such uncertainties.  Frigg's 
effort is an attack on him.  The gods raise the stakes when they bind Loki—they try to drive contingency, 
danger and death out of the world altogether, but their effort is fatal because without contingency, 
danger and death, there can be no life.xiii   
I mentioned at the outset Hyde's suggestion that “trickster only comes to life in the complex terrain of 
polytheism” (pp. 9-10).  The first reason for this is that the trickster plays his role in shaping the cosmos 
by tricking gods.  This is only possible with the sort of limited, specialised gods who are open to 
trickery.  There is no fooling the all-knowing, all-powerful god of the Abrahamic faiths.  Some tricks bring 
material benefits to humanity (fire, agriculture) while others change the ethical landscape.  That ought 
not be possible if the moral law is given by the absolute authority of the unlimited god of monotheism.  
Moreover, the trickster is the god of radical contingency, but a universe governed by the eternal, 
absolute authority of the god of Abraham can have no real contingency in it.  Things may look radically 
contingent to us finite creatures, but in Abrahamic monotheism the divine mind knows and approves of 
everything that happens and will happen.  A third reason is that the absolutely powerful god of Abraham 
needs no mediator to communicate with humanity.  The god of monotheism speaks to Abraham 
directly.  When this God, rather than speak directly to a prophet, sends an angel with a message, the 
angel is an entirely reliable mouthpiece for God.xiv  The trickster-mediators, in contrast, may spin or 
invent messages for their own tricky purposes, unbeknownst to the limited gods whose messages they 
carry.  The trickster-mediator expresses in the mytho-poetic register the unreliability of all 
communication, whereas the Abrahamic faiths all suggest, one way or another, that it is possible to 
received the word of God in a reliable form.xv   
Finally, the trickster needs polytheism because he is a god (or at least some sort of mythic being), and 
could not possibly be the only one.  No human being can be a trickster spirit any more than an ordinary 
coyote can be Coyote.  'Trickster coming to life' means that his spirit is one of the social forces shaping 
our world, along with the bureaucrat, the entrepreneur, the politician, and so on.   
Weber's 'polytheism' 
These, then, are our two spirits, the bureaucrat and the trickster.  These are the gods of the two 
tendencies in modern life that we encountered at the outset—on one side, the rationalising tendency of 
academic quality assurance and standardised summative assessment, and on the other the exuberant 
anarchy of fizzing ideas.  Now, we need Weber to argue that we do in fact live in the ‘complex terrain of 
polytheism’ (the second of his three functions in this paper).  In 'Science as a Vocation', Weber wrote:  
We live as did the ancients when their world was not yet disenchanted of its gods and demons, 
only we live in a different sense.  As Hellenic man at times sacrificed to Aphrodite and at other 
times to Apollo, and above all, everybody sacrificed to the gods of his city, so do we still 
nowadays, only the bearing of man has been disenchanted and denuded of its mystical but 
inwardly genuine plasticity.  Fate, and certainly not ‘science’, holds sway over these gods and 
their struggles.  One can only understand what the godhead is for one order or for the other, or 
better what godhead is in one or the other order.  (p. 148) 
What Weber meant by this is that we are subject to distinct and sometimes contradictory demands from 
separate 'ethical orders'.  He elaborated this in 'Politics as a Vocation', where he was especially 
interested in the ethical demands on political leaders.  (He gave these two 'vocation' lectures to German 
students in 1918.)  According to Weber, the state is defined by the monopoly it claims on the legitimate 
use of violence.  A political leader is thus committed to state violence as an acceptable means, even if as 
a matter of fact he or she never declares war or orders out the national guard.  Since Europe in Weber's 
day was supposed to be governed by Christian values, this raises a problem, because “The genius or 
demon of politics lives in an inner tension with the god of love…” (p. 126).  In general, there is a conflict 
between the proper ethical order of politics, which demands that the political leader must be prepared 
to use violence and take responsibility for the consequences of policy, and any 'ethics of absolute ends' 
(such as the Sermon on the Mount) that insists that consequences are not important next to the 
imperative to do the right thing.  As Weber put it, the saint is commanded “resist not him that is evil 
with force”, but “for the politician the reverse proposition holds, ‘thou shalt resist evil by force,’ or else 
you are responsible for evil winning out.”  (pp. 119-120).xvi 
Even if we do not consider an ethic of ultimate ends, there is a contrast in Weber's writing between the 
ethical demands on the political leader and those on the civil servant.  The political leader is an 
advocate, for policy, for party advantage, for the interests of some social group or class, and ultimately 
for the politician’s own convictions and claims on power.  The civil servant (in the ideal type of 
bureaucracy described above), on the other hand, must not advocate anything, but must rather be the 
reliable instrument of decisions made higher up.  “The honor of the civil servant is vested in his ability to 
execute conscientiously the order of the superior authorities, exactly as if the order agreed with his own 
conviction.  Without this moral discipline and self-denial, in the highest sense, the whole apparatus 
would fall to pieces.”  (p. 95).  The good leader and the good civil servant are committed to different 
ethical orders.  If these were personified as gods, the deities would have different characters, expressed 
in different myths.  Of course, human politicians and civil servants must be subject to ethical demands 
other than those of their professions, be it the god of love, or Christian charity, or Kantian rectitude or 
some other such ethic.  Otherwise, the demand of professional ethics on politicians that they be 
prepared to use violence when necessary would allow any end to justify any means, and the honour of 
civil servants would require them to be the willing instruments of any policy, however evil.  This is the 
‘inner tension’ between the demands of different spirits.   
Weber generalised this thought.  Considering the suggestion that there could be a single ethical code to 
govern all human life, he asked (rhetorically, expecting a negative answer), “But is it true that any ethic 
of the world could establish commandments of identical content for erotic, business, familial, and 
official relations; for the relations to one’s wife, to the greengrocer, the son, the competitor, the friend, 
the defendant?” (pp. 118-9).  Part of the point of these two 'vocation' lectures is that the political leader 
and the scientist are committed to different ethical orders.  The leader must offer a moral vision and 
recommend action; the scientist must not—the scientific ethic forbids it.   
This multiplicity of ethical orders is a feature of all societies, but Weber argues that some handle it 
better than others.  Polytheisms do it best; they simply have different gods associated with different 
ethical orders.  “We are placed into various life-spheres, each of which is governed by different 
laws.  Religious ethics have settled with this fact in different ways.  Hellenistic polytheism made 
sacrifices to Aphrodite and Hera alike, to Dionysus and Apollo, and knew these gods were frequently in 
conflict with one another.”  (p. 123).  The ease with which ancient polytheists simultaneously venerated 
gods of apparently differing ethical orders is what Weber meant by 'inwardly genuine plasticity'.  Such a 
person can supplicate the goddess of unruly passion while at the same time paying due respect to the 
goddess of faithful matrimony, simply by not thinking too much about the contradiction.  The 
multiplicity of ethical orders is more of a problem for us, because our world and our action in it is 
rationalised, theorised, intellectualised, and therefore such contradictions are harder for us to ignore.  In 
philosophy, the two modern giants of moral thought, Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, took it for 
granted that there is a single moral system—they devoted their efforts to working out what it is.xvii    
Medieval Christendom too had its distinct ethical orders: “There stands the monk who must not shed 
blood or strive for gain, and beside him stand the pious knight and the burgher, who are allowed to do 
so, the one to shed blood and the other to pursue gain.”  (p. 124).  The fiction that monk, knight and 
burgher were all governed by the same ethical order was sustained for a while by doctrinal footwork, 
but this, Weber, maintains, is no longer possible: “our civilization destines us to realize more clearly 
these struggles again, after our eyes have been blinded for a thousand years—blinded by the allegedly 
or presumably exclusive orientation towards the exclusive moral fervor of Christian 
ethics.”  (p. 149).  The reason for this falling of the scales from our eyes is, of course, rationalisation.  The 
disenchantment of the world robs Christianity of its authority, while rising intellectualisation throws the 
contradictions between ethical orders into sharper relief.xviii   
Weber’s Sociology of Religion 
So far, we have encountered Weber as the theorist of bureaucracy and as the author of the two 
‘vocation’ essays of 1918, in which we find the idea of distinct and incompatible ethical orders most 
powerfully expressed.  One can imagine the material on bureaucracy re-ordered and re-titled 
‘Administration as a Vocation’.  However, there is another side to Weber.  He was also an early and 
prolific sociologist of religion.  His most influential book is probably The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, in which he argued that one (but only one) of the enabling conditions for the emergence of 
capitalism was a form of this-worldly asceticism that he associated especially with Calvinism.  His studies 
of other world religions were partly motivated by the question whether anything of the sort is found 
elsewhere, and if not, whether this might help to explain why capitalism arose uniquely in Europe.  
These studies of religion were extensive, and one might wonder whether there is a connection to be 
made between Weber the sociologist of religion and Weber the theorist of modern ‘polytheism’.   
In fact, there is no direct link between the ‘polytheism’ material (which is mostly found in his two 
'vocation' essays) and his sociology of religion, in part because the latter is focussed on the various 
'salvation' religions, which are mostly either monotheistic or non-theist (Buddhism).  While he mentions 
ancient polytheism from time to time, he did not write a sociology of it.  He did write extensively about 
one kind of polytheism, namely Hinduism, but his interest was to understand why it seemed to him 
incompatible with the spirit of capitalism.xix  While he examined many aspects and varieties of Hinduism, 
he did not do the experiment of comparing Hinduism as a form of polytheism with the 'polytheism' of 
competing value spheres that he describes in the 'vocation' essays.  Nor did he ask how Hindus cope 
with the multiplicity of incompatible value spheres—indeed, in his sociology of religion he did not ask 
this question of any of the world religions, perhaps because his root enquiry about the non-emergence 
of capitalism outside Europe did not demand it.   
In any case, there are two related differences between Hinduism and the ‘polytheism’ of Weber’s 
vocation essays.  First, the teeming multitude of Hindu gods are all related in some way to Brahman, the 
ontologically ultimate source and sustainer of all things.  Characterising their dependency on Brahman is 
a subtle matter that we need not enter into.  The vital point is that the metaphysical status and religious 
function of the Hindu gods cannot be understood without reference to their relation to Brahman.xx  
There is nothing in Weber’s view that corresponds to Brahman.  There is, for him, no unifying divinity 
‘behind’ or ‘beneath’ or ‘above’ the gods of his particular ethical spheres.  The second, related point is 
that it is part of Hindu faith that the conflicts and contradictions that we finite, unenlightened 
consciousnesses encounter are merely apparent.  Ultimate reality is, for Hindus, self-consistent.xxi  In 
Weber, the conflicts between the demands of different ethical orders are real, and are not to be 
resolved or dissolved by achieving a higher or more enlightened point of view.  In this sense, Weber’s 
outlook is tragic rather than religious.  For him, the contradictions in our systems of values go all the way 
down.   
Few Weber scholars attempt to relate Weber's 'polytheism' thesis to his sociology of religion, perhaps 
for the reasons just discussed.  One of the few is Roger Friesland, who argues (2013) that Weber's 
polytheistic theory of multiple spheres of value does not map on to his sociology of religion.  In his 
studies of religion, Weber invokes various binary distinctions, and Friesland claims that the practices 
that enact commitment to the 'gods' of Weber's distinct value-spheres cut across these oppositions.  If 
we wished to defend Weber on this point, we might remember that his sociology of religion was mostly 
about salvation religions that in some sense 'reject the world', and so its analytical machinery has no 
bearing on the disenchanted, worldly 'polytheism' that he discussed in his 'vocations' essays.  In any 
case, the justice of Friesland's criticism need not concern us, because no part of the present argument 
appeals to or depends upon Weber's sociology of religion.  
Weber uses the language of polytheism to make two points.  The first is his view that we live among 
multiple incompatible ethical orders.  The second is his contrast between the ease with which ancient 
polytheistic religious cultures dealt with this ethical multiplicity (aided by their mystical inward plasticity) 
and the difficulty that we have in our rationalised, intellectualised culture.  He does not suppose that 
these 'gods' are beings who might be summoned or supplicated, or who might intervene in human 
affairs, or that anyone thinks of them in such terms.  For him, the mytho-poetic register is a façon de 
parler rather than a metaphysical commitment.xxii   
If Weber is right about polytheism, what about monotheism, unity and integrity?  
Weber announced the return of polytheism in 1918, but in spite of his argument and analysis, 
monotheistic religions remain popular, and the notion that there should be one ethical order for all 
occasions retains its grip (in spite of recent vogues for virtue ethics and ethical particularism among 
professional philosophers).  Rationalisation (and in particular, intellectualisation) may be part of the 
explanation.  At the level of theory, we do want to know how it all hangs together—this is one of the 
deep reasons why philosophy is present in all developed cultures.  If there are many ethical orders, how 
do they relate to each other, and what do we do when they conflict?  For orderly philosophical minds, it 
is tempting to seek some higher-level account that will resolve all ethical conflicts, rather than to 
recognise that there may be irresolvably tragic dilemmas in life.  However, most people are not 
principally driven by such demands of theoretical reason, so monotheism must have some other 
appeal.  
Its political advantages are obvious.  The earthly representative of the One True God need brook no 
opposition, while the king-priest of one god among many has to pay at least formal respect to the 
others.xxiii  Moreover, extinct polytheisms of the sort that Weber had in mind tend to be morally and 
psychologically unsatisfying.  Odin and Zeus may look on humanity benignly, but no member of any 
pantheon loves you the way Jesus is said to.  Nor do such polytheisms guarantee cosmic justice.xxiv  Souls 
may be weighed after death, but on the whole restorative justice is not a big part of the polytheist 
offer.  Polytheisms recognise the radical contingency of life—that is one reason why tricksters need 
polytheism.  But anxious, suffering humanity hankers after the certainties of one god, whose one truth 
has been written down once and for all in one book, and the unconditional love of an infinitely wise, 
powerful and benevolent heavenly father.   
These are (admittedly speculative) reasons why people might wish to resist Weber's argument for the 
multiplicity of ethical orders.  However, there is a philosophical argument against Weber's view that 
arises from consideration of the unity of the person and the integrity of a life.xxv  According to this 
argument, it is both psychologically unhealthy and ethically undesirable for a person to be committed to 
rival ethical orders and for a life to be compartmentalised between them.  These views tend to see good 
mental health and ethically good living combining into a broad notion of ‘human flourishing’ or 
eudaimonia.  A life in which one lives by one ethic at work and another at home is said to lack 
integrity.  Beset by cognitive dissonance, according to this view, the compartmentalised individual 
cannot flourish fully.  There is certainly something to this, especially if someone behaves, speaks and 
thinks as if the ethic of one life-compartment were the universal morality, only to adopt different, 
allegedly universal principles in another.  However, the fault here lies in the notion of a single morality 
(together with the intellectualisation of ethics) rather than the compartmentalisation.  Persons with 
genuine mystical inner plasticity would not feel the cognitive dissonance (though they would still have to 
resolve practical dilemmas between ethical orders).  
Moreover, it's far from obvious that relentless consistency is necessarily a good thing.  Someone who 
sticks to one ethical order will make a bad job of other aspects of life.  Great political leaders are often 
not very good parents; voters who assess every policy solely in terms of its effects on their own children 
are not the best citizens.  There is a picture of the human psyche due to Nietzsche and Freud in which a 
human personality is not a simple unit, as Descartes (for example) imagined.  Rather, the 'soul' of a 
human is a sort of society of personas, ancestral voices, inherited tendencies and ingrained habits.xxvi  On 
this picture, the unity of a personality is an achievement.  With this picture in mind, we can ask what 
sort of society your psyche might be.  The view of the eudaimonists who insist on absolute integrity and 
consistency make the society constituting a well-ordered soul sound rather conformist and uniform, 
with every member sharing the same basic outlook.  Perhaps a healthy soul has rather more variety in it 
than this, though the nature of its unity then becomes more of an interesting problem, both for the 
philosopher and the person trying to live a decent life.xxvii   
Here, then, is another reason why polytheism has not swept all before it.  The existence of multiple 
ethical orders is existentially strenuous, because ethical orders are not merely social structures or forces 
external to us.  Rather, they are part of our inner structure.  If I feel the force of several incompatible 
ethical orders, then the differences between them are divisions in me.  Weber himself addresses this in 
the final pages of ‘Politics as a Vocation’.  Having contrasted the demon of politics with the god of love 
(or less mytho-poetically, the ethics of responsibility with the ethics of ultimate ends), he notes that a 
politician who served only the former would be a monster.  “An ethic of ultimate ends and an ethic of 
responsibility are not absolute contrasts but rather supplements which only in unison constitute a 
genuine man.” (p. 127).  This ‘unison’ is not easy to achieve, but rather requires “trained relentlessness 
in viewing the realities of life, and the ability to face such realities and to measure up to them inwardly” 
(pp. 126-7).  Even so, there may be insolvable conflicts between them, in which case the best we can do 
may be to recognise such conflicts clearly, without denial or bad faith, and claim as our own whatever 
decision we make.  One of the attractive promises of monotheism is to relieve us of this existential 
strain by offering to resolve such conflicts.   
My conviction, for which I have not argued adequately here, is that Weber is right about the multiple 
ethical orders.  This means that there will be tragic occasions when ethical demands conflict, and there 
is no higher system or authority to resolve them.  Monotheism cannot deliver on this promise.  The 
paradigm for this is Antigone, caught between equally pressing loyalties to family and city.  It also means 
that we will carry these divisions and conflicts between ethical orders within us, and feel them 
sometimes as dilemmas, as cognitive dissonance or as ethical paralysis.  Too bad!  Hyde suggests that 
trickster spirits can help on these occasions—and perhaps they might—but they are unreliable.  It would 
have taken a very slippery trick to save Antigone.   
The trickster’s role in practical polytheism 
We seem to have come a long way from the original questions about anarchy and order in modern 
life.  What does all this stuff about gods and Antigone mean for that agenda?  The first task in this 
concluding section is to descend from the mytho-poetic plane.  These various gods and spirits are really 
social forces.  They show themselves in the cultures and structures of society, or not at all.  They are 
active forces (rather than dead cultural forms) because they are also part of our psyches.  To call them 
beliefs would be to over-intellectualise them.   The official who shudders inwardly when a decision is not 
properly recorded does not merely believe a proposition about bureaucracy, nor does the hustling 
entrepreneur merely believe some piece of theory about market economics.  Their gods are alive within 
them; they feel and act on their commitment to their respective ethical orders.  There is no magic here, 
just a meeting of culture, psychology and ethics.    
Hyde himself offers a descending staircase from the mytho-poetic plane to a more practical level:  
…trickster belongs to polytheism or, lacking that, he needs a relationship to other powers, to 
people and institutions and traditions that can manage the old double attitude of both insisting 
that their boundaries be respected and recognizing that in the long run their liveliness depends 
on having those boundaries regularly disturbed.  (p. 13) 
That 'old double standard' is close to Weber's 'inward plasticity'.  Both thoughts require respect for 
multiple centres of authority and energy.  That is why the other gods never kill the trickster, however 
annoying he is (even Loki, after murdering Baldr, is not executed, which is not what one might expect in 
the warrior culture of Asgard).  This mutual respect among mythic beings is a two-way street.  The 
trickster stirs things up, but he does not declare war on the established powers—his need for them is as 
obvious than their need for him.  This observation of Hyde’s is a staircase to the practical level, because 
it is open to human powers, people, institutions and traditions to maintain that double standard.  In 
particular, it offers a modus vivendi to the ill-matched spirits of anarchic learning and orderly 
administration, of creativity and bureaucracy.   
In mytho-poetic terms, polytheism requires recognising and respecting the servants of many 
gods.  Speaking prosaically, to take the university as an example, the stickler for human resources 
processes, the academic quality assurance pedant, the absentee researcher and the dedicated 
classroom teacher are all doing their proper offices according to their own ethical orders.  None of these 
gods is an absolute authority—including the god of classroom teaching, whose hierophants can be as 
tiresomely pious as any other true believers.  Moreover, in cases of conflict, there is no recipe for a 
resolution.  As the stories of strife in Asgard or Olympus remind us, such conflicts are decided by a 
combination of practical wisdom and personal politics—and sometimes, trickery.  So here is one 
practical consequence: that a confrontation between functions is a confrontation between ethical 
orders that has to be negotiated on the basis of mutual recognition.  Furthermore, it is in these 
circumstances that a trickster might be invoked—provided that all parties to the negotiation recognise 
trickery as an option.  Coyote may help here precisely because he has no way of his own.  Unlike the rest 
of us, the trickster is not subject to déformation professionnelle, that is, he has not been bent out of 
shape by having to conform to the norms of a professional function.  This requires Hyde's ‘double 
standard’.  In this, then, is a second practical consequence.  Trickery might mean something as simple as 
using a bureaucratic structure or process for something other than its intended purpose.  Computer 
programmers do this all the time with programming functions, but this is easy for them, because 
programming functions, unlike bureaucratic functions, are not normally part of someone's ethical 
order.xxviii  Recognising the ethical seriousness of bureaucratic functions (for example), involves paying 
some respect to their priests, temples and rites.  This is especially important precisely on the occasions 
when one pulls a trick on them.   
One place where the trickster spirit appears in corporate life is in the management brainstorming away-
day led by a consultant.  When this sort of exercise goes well, it is because some elements of the 
trickster persona have worked together.  First, like the man in the Yoruba story, the participants have 
been taken out of their usual location where they have settled roles, responsibilities and relationships.  
An unfamiliar location permits much higher levels of contingency.  Second, the consultant is a liminal 
figure, partly inside and partly outside the organisation.  This allows consultants to say what would be 
otherwise be unsayable.  Like the trickster gods, the consultant does not have a place in the hierarchy or 
a specific area of competence.  A consultant, it is said, is the person who borrows your watch to tell you 
the time; the consultant, like Coyote, has no way of their own but uses the ways of others.  The 
exercises that the consultant asks the participants to carry out may be tricksy because they break down 
established forms and habits, because they exploit features of human psychology, because the 
participants can’t immediately see their point or because they cannot be used on the same people twice 
(and are therefore, in mathematical terms, more like tricks than methods).  These occasions are often 
uneasy, even if the participants understand the need for fresh thinking and that they need some help 
doing it.  Part of this unease arises from the knowledge that they are being worked on and manipulated 
by a trickster (albeit a benevolent one).  Part of it may be the natural resentment of honest burghers in 
fixed occupations towards itinerant opportunists.  The consultant seems to make an easy living out of 
flim-flam rather than doing a proper job.  Even without this resentment, though, there is a deeper 
source of unease.  To adjust Hyde’s words only slightly, such brainstorming occasions require the senior 
bureaucrats of the organisation to achieve a double attitude of both insisting that their functions be 
respected while recognising that in the long run their livelihoods depend on having those functions 
disturbed.  That is a tricky thing to do.  You have to think outside your function, knowing that you were 
only invited to participate in virtue of that very function.   
Next, I want to return to the ‘Ragnarok’ point.  Training may be an orderly activity, in which students 
acquire skills and knowledge by following a 'learning journey' that has been planned by an 
instructor.  Training in a discipline must include the discipline's methods.  Students must learn 
entrenchment in the Roman style.  Education, however, requires that students' minds remain lively even 
as they submit to the demands of their disciplines.  We hope that they have insights of their own as well 
as a grasp of pre-planned curriculum content, and this requires from them an openness to the fizzing 
together of two apparently unrelated topics or tasks and the unlooked-for opportunities presented by 
happy accidents.xxix   We want students to be able to do tricks with the ideas they gain from their books 
as well as follow methods.  They should have the Greek camp-design option, too.  Education requires 
teachers to allow for unplanned teachable moments in their classrooms, and it requires academic 
quality and teaching management regimes to recognise the need for contingency and 
uncertainty.  Where authorities attempt to drive contingency out of learning and teaching by (for 
example) insisting on detailed lesson plans and module and programme descriptions, it's Ragnarok all 
over again. 
Lastly, I want to return to professional ethics.  As we saw, Weber claimed that different vocations have 
ethical orders that are not only different but may well be contradictory.  The vocations of politician, 
bureaucrat and scientist say contradictory things about the holding and enacting of moral visions.  We 
should expect this point to extend into other professions such as law and medicine.xxx  For example, a GP 
has to be an advocate of individual patients, but the official charged with deciding which treatments 
should be publicly funded must not act with individuals in mind.  Moreover, doctors and lawyers have 
other ‘spheres of life’ in addition to their vocations, and we should expect these to make ethical 
demands that are different from and perhaps in conflict with their vocational ethical orders.  Just as with 
Weber’s politicians and civil servants, there should be a place for the god of love, or else we are no more 
than the sum of our roles and stations.  Polytheism as a practical attitude means recognising that there 
are diverse and contradictory ethical orders built into the world around us and active with our 
psyches.  This may not seem like very comforting knowledge, but at least, when suffering from the 
resulting existential strain, one has the consoling thought that ‘it's not just me’.  Moreover, once we 
recognise that negotiation among ethical authorities, none of whom is absolute, is unavoidable, then we 
can get on with learning to do it wisely and well.  Or if we can't manage wisdom, we can aim for guile.  
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i The ideas in this paper developed as a result of a discussion with Dr Beverly Clack, and I’m grateful for the help she gave 
me to clarify and elaborate the problem.   
ii I’m grateful to the mathematician Prof Michael Harris for bringing Hyde’s book to my attention.  He first got interested in 
tricksters when one of his mathematical innovations was described as ‘Harris’s tensor trick’, and he wondered how to 
take this epithet (see Harris 2015 and especially chapter eight). 
iii ‘Science as a vocation’ p. 149 in Weber 1948.  
iv Op. cit. p. 155.  The phrase belongs to Friedrich Schiller. 
v Toulmin 2001 pp. 36-7 
vi ‘Science as a vocation’ p. 139 in Weber 1948. 
vii Weber 1947 p. 337. 
viii This is one of the new gods battling for control of our lives along with Weber's resurgent old gods that I mentioned at the 
start. 
ix The entrepreneurial spirit has made some inroads into higher education, but for the most part, recent decades have seen the 
strengthening of bureaucracy in universities.  For example, the movement from collegial governance to management by an all-
powerful executive has increased bureaucracy, because the first demand of the executive, on seizing power from the 
professoriat, is that the university should become a more reliable, calculable instrument of executive policy.  See du Gay (2000).  
I am grateful to Dr Matthew Sinnicks for bringing this book to my attention.   
x See Bloom et al (2010) for essays on trickster figures in English literature.  
xi See Harris (2015) and especially chapter eight. 
xii Essentially, Hyde’s argument is that the trickster is a morally unreliable, risk-taking rolling stone, but this is not compatible 
with raising young.  Apparently, in the mytho-poetic register, being female means being a good mother.  But see Tannen (2007), 
Landay (1998) or McNeely (1996) for female versions of the Jungian trickster archetype.   Hyde does not seem to depend on 
Jung for his understanding of the trickster stories and there is no Jungian subtext to the present paper.   
xiii Hyde may have massaged the original Norse tale at this point—my thanks to Prof Stephen Clark for this and several other 
helpful notes. 
xiv
 Christ has something of the trickster about him; he is a mediator who changes the moral landscape and whose messages are 
paradoxically tricky (the first shall be last, etc.).   That is not surprising, because Christianity, with its trinity, its god-man whose 
divinity is announced by his miraculous birth, who, like Osiris, is raised in a holy family (the divinity of which is depicted by 
Egyptian-style solar disks around the heads), who is resurrected from the dead, is a syncretism of paganism and monotheism.   
xv Here is another reason why an educator might raise a shrine to the trickster.  Teaching is, inevitably and always, an exercise 
in unreliable communication. 
xvi For analytic completeness, note that Weber had in mind the tension between the occasional political imperative to make 
war and the standing Christian imperative to make peace, but it could go the other way round.  In a society dominated by 
martial values that saw war as a standing duty, this ‘ultimate end’ would be in tension with the ethos of politics at those times 
when politics recommends peace.   
                                                 
                                                                                                                                                             
xvii See Strawson (1961) for a nuanced discussion of the relation between the various and often incompatible ethical ideals that 
may grip a person, and the common morality that must govern the pursuit of such ideals.  I am not aware of any influence from 
Weber on Strawson.  Strawson’s ideals are not quite the same as Weber’s departments of life, being as they are visions of how 
a whole life might be lived.  I am grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing this article to my attention.  A version of value 
pluralism is central to the work of Isaiah Berlin, who denied any influence from Weber, and appears in later thinkers most of 
whom similarly seem to make no reference to Weber.  There is no mention of Weber in the Stanford Encyclopedia article on 
value pluralism.  See Lassman (2011) for a systematic treatment that includes the literature stemming from both Weber and 
Berlin.   
xviii Hutton (2013 p. 336) argues that polytheism persisted through the middle ages in Britain, in the form of cults of specialist 
saints, “which represented the most active means of devotion for many, if not most, medieval people”.  He firmly repudiates 
any attempt to identify specific Christian saints with pagan gods—rather, the polytheistic habit of mind and practice survived 
and found new expression in the saints of the new religion.  The cult of the saints was a target of the reformation, so perhaps 
the ‘moral fervour of Christian ethics’ that Weber had in mind dates only from then.   
xix See Singer, M. (1961) for a critical assessment of Weber on this point.   
xx See Kesarcodi-Watson (1976) for a careful discussion of the place of Brahman in Hindu tradition.   
xxi See, for example, Daniélou (1964 p. 16) for the reconciliation of love and death in Brahman.   
xxii I am grateful to the referee whose questions prompted this insertion of this section.  He or she also asked whether Weber 
ever mentioned the trickster spirit.  The answer to the best of my knowledge is ‘no’.  George P. Hansen (2001) wants to identify 
the trickster with Weber’s notion of charisma, but this is surely a mistake.  Charisma, in Weber, is a form of authority.  The 
charismatic leader attracts followers by performing miracles, winning battles or otherwise dazzling with magic.  The trickster 
has no followers, is not an authority figure, and in any case if you can do magic, you don't need to do tricks. 
xxiii Hutton (2013), explains the complete eradication of paganism from Britain as a consequence of the fact that pagans had no 
interest in suppressing Christianity (seeing it as one more religious option in the all-permissive pagan polytheist scene), while 
Christianity was intent on eliminating all other forms of worship.   
xxiv Here too there may be an important difference between Hinduism and the extinct European polytheisms that Weber had in 
mind.   
xxv Versions of it may be found in the works of Søren Kierkegaard and Alasdair MacIntyre.   
xxvi Of course, versions of the analogy between society and psyche go back at least as far as Plato.   
xxvii See Nietzsche’s claim that the mark of a high mind is to be a battleground divided between the two ethical orders that he 
discerned in European culture.  Genealogy of Spirit, first essay section 16.   
xxviii There is now a literature on hackers as tricksters that refers to Hyde.  See, for example, Nikitina (2012).   
xxix Scientific folklore recognises this in such myths as the lucky discovery of penicillin. 
xxx This paper originated in a meeting on professional ethical training focussed on law and medicine.   
